It is widely believed that local currency bond markets (LCBMs) can promote financial stability in developing countries. For instance, they can help mitigate the currency and maturity mismatch that contributed to the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis of [1997][1998]. In this paper, we empirically test such conventional wisdom on the stabilizing effect of LCBMs. To do so, we analyze and compare the financial vulnerability of developing countries during two episodes of financial stress -global financial crisis and taper tantrum. We find that countries which experienced greater expansion of their LCBMs between the two episodes experienced a greater reduction of exchange rate depreciation, indicating a stabilizing role of LCBMs. Our evidence indicates that a gradual expansion of bank loans may also contribute to financial stability. On the other hand, we do not find any evidence of a stabilizing effect of stock market development.
Introduction
Currency and maturity mismatches are widely viewed as a main source of financial vulnerability in developing economies.
1 If a country's financial liabilities are denominated in a foreign currency such as the US dollars but its financial assets are denominated in domestic currency, then a sudden depreciation of the domestic currency damages its balance sheet, destabilizing the financial system and economy. If the maturity of financial liabilities is shorter than that of assets, the likelihood of a crisis further increases. In short, borrowing short-term in a foreign currency and lending long-term in domestic currency is a recipe for instability and even crisis. For example, the double mismatch of currency and maturity mismatch was a contributing factor behind the devastating Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. The literature points to other benefits of LCBM development in developing economies.
For example, Caballero et al. (2008) argued that the chronic excess demand for U.S. assets which contributed to global imbalances is due to financial underdevelopment in emerging markets. Vibrant LCBMs of varying maturities, in addition to mitigating the double mismatch problem, can increase the supply of Asian financial assets and thus help channel the region's ample savings into the region's own investments. Prasad (2011) argues that a more developed financial system which effectively channels funds into productive uses and enables better risksharing would promote growth in Asia by encouraging more entrepreneurial activity. IMF (2016) emphasizes the increasingly important role of LCBMs as a source of long-term funding for long-term investments such as infrastructure and housing.
The central objective of our paper is to empirically investigate the role of LCBMs in enhancing financial stability in developing economies by mitigating currency and maturity mismatches.
To do so, we analyze and compare the financial vulnerability of developing countries during two episodes of financial stress -global financial crisis and taper tantrum. We find that countries which experienced greater expansion of their LCBMs between the two episodes experienced a greater reduction of exchange rate depreciation, indicating a stabilizing role of LCBMs. Our evidence indicates that a gradual expansion of bank loans may also contribute to financial stability. On the other hand, we do not find any evidence of a stabilizing effect of stock market development.
The reminder of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we explore recent developments in LCBMs in Asia. In section 3, we lay out our empirical framework. In section 4, we report and discuss the empirical findings of the paper. Section 5 concludes.
Recent Developments in Asia's Local Currency Bond Markets
Data on the amount outstanding of LCBMs are not widely available. While Asian Bonds Online reports time series data for the size of LCBMs, it covers only 10 Asian countries:
China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. In this paper, to include as many developing economies as possible, we use the BIS (Bank for International Settlements) debt securities statistics in our main empirical analysis.
3
The BIS debt securities statistics reports total debt securities (TDS) issued by residents.
TDS are divided into domestic debt securities (DDS) and international debt securities (IDS).
4
Since DDS are not separately reported for different currency denominations, we assume that 3 A number of authors used the BIS (Bank for International Settlements) data to measure the size of LCBMS. See, for example, Bae (2012) and Burger and Warnock (2006 
Empirical Framework
In theory, one main benefit of LCBMs is to foster financial stability by mitigating currency and maturity mismatches. A logical implication is that LCBM development reduces the vulnerability of financial markets in developing countries to external shocks. We can test this hypothesis following the empirical approach used by Eichengreen and Gupta (EG, 2013) and Park, Ramayandi and Shin et al. (PRS, 2016) . Those studies sought to identify the factors associated with the destabilizing impact of the taper tantrum on developing economies. More specifically, both studies used exchange rate depreciation as the measure of financial vulnerability, and empirically analyzed which factors influence the effect of QE tapering on exchange rate depreciation.
The basic regression equation estimated by EG and PRS takes the following linear form: 
where p=1 (period 1) is for the global financial crisis and p=2 (period 2), for the taper tantrum. 8 The list of emerging countries is in Appendix Table A1 .
9 Please refer to Park, et al. (2016) for a more comprehensive discussion of the variables and data.
One advantage of considering both periods is that now we can eliminate country fixed effects by combining the experiences in the two periods. Since the estimation of equation (1) in EG and PRS is a cross-section regression, unobservable country fixed effects, may not have been completely eliminated, generating biased estimates:
In equation (3), if and are correlated, the estimates of β should be biased. However, if country fixed effects, , are not time varying, we can eliminate country fixed effects by taking the difference of equation (3) across periods and estimating the following equation:
where ∆ = 2 − 1 , ∆ = 2 − 1 and = 2 − 1 . Note that since is no longer present, estimates of β in (4) are not biased.
Empirical Findings
The data sources for most explanatory variables are the World Bank's World
Development Indicators (WDI) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s International
Financial Statistics (IFS). 10 More specifically, the current-account deficit as percentage of GDP, the foreign reserves-M2 ratio, real GDP growth rate, and inflation are collected from WDI. The real exchange rate is calculated by using the nominal exchange rate against the U.S.
dollars and both domestic and the U.S. Consumer Price Indices (CPI), collected from IFS.
Private capital flows data are measured by net incurrence of liabilities of equity, debt securities, and other debt instruments in financial account reported in IMF's Balance of Payments 10 Definitions of variables and data sources are explained in Appendix Table A2 .
Statistics (BOPS). Exchange rate regime classification follows the categorizations of annual fine classification in Ilzetzki et al. (2017). The stock of portfolio liabilities is obtained from the
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti dataset that extends Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) . Table 1 presents summary statistics of the variables for both periods 1 and 2. On average, the nominal exchange rate depreciation, the dependent variable of equation (1), is much lower in period 2 than in period 1, indicating that the impact of the taper tantrum on emerging economies was much less severe than the global financial crisis. Comparison of the statistics across periods yields other interesting observations. For example, deterioration of the currentaccount deficit and capital inflows were larger during period 2 than during period 1. There is not much difference in other explanatory variables. Table 2 reports the regression results of equation (1) in period 2. In column (1), we replicate PRS except that we did not include real GDP growth and the rule of law as explanatory variables.
11 While the number of observations increased substantially due to changes in the IFS database, the main results in PRS are preserved. 12 For example, the appreciation of real exchange rates and increase in credit to GDP ratio are highly significant at the 1% level. While the increase in current account deficit is not significant in column (1), it is highly significant at the 1% level in the last column. In column (2), we use only the size of LCBMs as an explanatory variable. We add an Asia dummy that takes the value of one for seven Asian countries and zero otherwise in column (3) 13 . Irrespective of whether the Asia dummy is included or not, the size of LCBMs is not statistically significant, indicating that countries with a larger LCBMs do not necessarily experience less exchange rate depreciation.
Since the size of LCBMs is available only for a limited number of countries, it might not be desirable to include too many explanatory variables. The reduction in the number of observations due to the inclusion of LCBM size may cause the problem of overfitting if all the explanatory variables are included simultaneously. Hence, in columns (4)- (7), besides the size of LCBMS and the Asia dummy, we include two additional explanatory variables in turn. In 11 Since the GDP growth and the rule of law were neve significant in PRS, we decide to omit them. 12 The reason the number of observations differs is due to capital inflows data. For this paper, we downloaded the data on March ?, 2017 from the web site, http://data.imf.org/?sk=5DABAFF2-C5AD-4D27-A175-1253419C02D1, while PRS used IMF (2013), published as a CD-Rom in December 2013. Interestingly observations reported as zeros in the CD-Rom are reported as missing values in the web site. We sum up the amounts of bonds, equity and loans flows unless any of the three flows is missing. 13 The seven Asian countries are China, Indonesia, India, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. Vietnam is not include in the Asian dummy since the BIS debt securities data are not available for it.
column (4), for example, we include the increase in current account deficit and the average annual percent change in real exchange rate and, in column (5), the increase in credit to GDP ratio and the log of portfolio liabilities, and so on. In column (8), in addition to the size of LCBMS and the Asia dummy, we include all significant variables in (4)-(7). In the last column, however, we also report the estimation results when all the explanatory variables are included.
The results show that neither the size of LCBMs or the Asia dummy is statistically significant in any column. Hence the cross-section regression results for period 2 seem to suggest that LCBMs did not necessarily mitigate the impact of the taper tantrum in emerging economies.
In Table 3 , we report the same cross-section regression results for period 1. Unlike the results for period 2, the increase in current account deficit and the average annual percentage change in real exchange rate are not statistically significant. Instead, the increase in credit to GDP ratio and the log of portfolio liability are statistically significant in column (5) and the exchange rate regime and total capital inflows are statistically significant in column (6). Like the results in Table 2 , however, the size of LCBMs is not statistically significant in any column, suggesting that LCBMs did not mitigate the impact of the global financial crisis either.
In Table 4 .1, we report the regression results of equation (4) by differencing all the variables from period 2 to period 1. In column (1), only the increase in current account deficit is statistically significant with the right sign. In column (4), the increase in current account deficit is even more statistically significant. In columns (5) and (6), the increase in credit to GDP ratio, the reserves-M2 ratio, and inflation are all statistically significant with the right sign.
While the coefficient of average annual percent change in real exchange rate has a wrong sign in column (4), it becomes insignificant in column (8), which includes all the variables that are significant in columns (4)- (7). On the other hand, the increase in current account deficit, the reserves-M2 ratio, and inflation are all statistically significant with the right sign even in column (8). The coefficient of the size of LCBMs is mostly negative but not statistically significant in columns (2)-(7). However, in columns (8) and (9), which includes more explanatory variables, the size of LCBMs becomes statistically significant at the 10 percent and the 5 percent levels, respectively, with the right sign. In other words, the results in columns (8) and (9) suggest that countries with larger LCBMs in period 2 than in period 1 experienced less exchange rate depreciation, indicating that have become more resilient to external shocks.
While Table 4 .1 provides some evidence that development of LCBMs enhances financial stability, the evidence is not compelling. Figure 5 illustrates the reason why this is so.
The figure presents the relation between the increase in the size of LCBMs on the horizontal axis and the increase in nominal exchange rate depreciation on the vertical axis. There is a clear negative relationship between the two if we exclude one outlier country, India. While the size of LCBM in India increased substantially from period 1 to period 2, there is not much improvement in exchange rate depreciation. We believe that this may be due to some data problems. Figure 6 illustrates the size of LCBMs collected from the BIS debt statistics for 24 individual countries. India seems to have a discrepancy in the data that occurred around 2011, a discrepancy that can overstate the increase in the size of LCBM between period 1 and period 2.
In light of such data problems, we exclude India from the sample and re-run the regression. Table 4 .2 reports the ex-India regression results. Now the coefficient of the size of LCBMs becomes much more statistically significant. In columns (2) and (3), irrespective of whether the Asia dummy is included or not, the coefficient of the size of LCBMs is negative at the 10 percent level of significance. Even when other explanatory variables are included, the coefficient of the size of LCBMs is always negative and, in many cases, statistically significant at either the 10 percent or the 5 percent level. Hence, if the outlier of India is excluded, we obtain more compelling evidence that development of LCBMs enhances financial stability.
However, Figure 5 also suggests a need for caution in making such conclusions, particularly for Asia. Even after excluding India, if we look only at Asian countries, in red circles, Figure 5 suggests that the expansion of LCBMs did not visibly reduce exchange rate depreciation during the taper tantrum. The only exception is Korea, which, among Asian countries, experienced the largest growth in LCBM and the largest reduction in depreciation.
In Malaysia and Thailand, even though LCBMs grew substantially between the two stress episodes, nominal exchange rate depreciation did not decline tangibly during the taper tantrum.
Interestingly, however, if we exclude all Asian countries, the negative relation between the difference in LCBM size and the difference in nominal exchange rate, is even stronger, implying a beneficial effect of LCBM on financial stability.
In Table 5 , we report regression results when we replace the difference in the size of LCBMs between the two periods with the difference in the size of bank loans, as percent of GDP. While the coefficient of the difference of bank loans in percent of GDP is always negative, it is statistically significant only in columns (5), (8) and (9). One common element of these columns is that the difference in increase in credit to GDP ratio is included as an explanatory variable. Note that this variable measures how rapidly the credit-to-GDP ratio increased before each stressed period. Hence the results suggest that if the increase in the credit-to-GDP ratio before the stress period is appropriately managed, the increase in the size of bank loans itself can be stabilizing. Usually a rapid increase in the credit-to-GDP ratio is accompanied by a rapid increase in noncore liabilities that mostly consist of foreign borrowings of the banking sector.
14 Hence a gradual increase in the bank loans to GDP ratio which is not accompanied by rapid increase in noncore liabilities can reduce vulnerability to external shocks. Figure 7 plots the relation between the increase in bank loans, as percent of GDP, and the increase in nominal exchange rate depreciation. 15 Since the difference in increase in credit to GDP ratio is not appropriately controlled, no clear negative relationship shows up etween the two variables.
Finally, Table 6 reports regression results when we replace the difference in the size of LCBMs between the two periods with the difference of stock market capitalization, as percentage of GDP. While the coefficient of the difference of stock market capitalization in percentage of GDP is always negative, it is statistically significant only in column (4), at the 10 percent level. Hence, the evidence of a contribution to financial stability is much weaker for stock markets than for LCBMs or bank loans. 16 Figure 8 plots the relation between the increase in stock market capitalization, as percentage of GDP, and the increase in nominal exchange rate depreciation. The figure fails to show any clear relationship between the two variables.
Conclusion
According to conventional wisdom, LCBMs can enhance financial stability in 14 See Shin and Shin (2011) for the concept of noncore liabilities. They classify retail deposits as core liabilities and the other components of bank funding as the noncore liabilities. Hahm et al. (2013) show that the noncore liabilities are mostly banking sector liabilities of the foreign sector and a large stock of noncore liabilities serves as an indicator if the erosion the risk premium and hence of vulnerability to a crisis. 15 In Figure 7 , Seychelles is an outlier. The regression results do not qualitatively change if we exclude Seychelles or not. Table 7 reports the regression results where Seychelles is excluded in the sample. 16 Since Jordan is an outlier, we report the results in Table 7 without including it in the sample of countries.
developing economies. In particular, developing LCBMs of varying maturities can mitigate the double mismatch of currency mismatch and maturity mismatch -i.e. borrowing short term in foreign currency and lending long term in domestic currency -that lay at the heart of the Asian financial crisis. In this paper, we empirically test this conventional wisdom by analyzing and comparing financial vulnerability during two episodes of financial stress -global financial crisis and taper tantrum -and the role of LCBM in reducing vulnerability. Our main finding is that developing economies which experienced greater expansion of their LCBMs between the two episodes experienced a greater reduction of exchange rate depreciation, a measure of financial vulnerability. This provides some empirical support for the notion that LCBMs protect the financial systems of developing countries from destabilizing external shocks.
The literature points to other benefits of fostering bigger, deeper, and more liquid LCBMs in development economies. They include mitigation of global imbalances, better risksharing, and long-term financing of long-term investments such as infrastructure and housing.
Of particular interest for developing countries is the role of LCBMs as facilitators of productive long-term investments that can lift long-term economic growth. Well-developed LCBMs can also contribute to a more diversified and balanced financial system which is more resilient to shocks. In the future, it will be interesting to empirically examine if the development of LCBMs generates these other benefits as well. At a broader level, empirically testing for the effects of LCBM development, instead of just assuming them, will give us a more accurate understanding of exactly how LCBMs benefit developing economies. 
. Growth of Local Currency Bond Markets in Various Regions
Note: The size of local currency bond markets is collected from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS Sources: Authors' calculation.
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Figure 6. The Size of Local Currency Bond Markets as Percentage of GDP Collected from the BIS Debt Securities Statistics
Note: We calculate the size of local currency bond markets by adding the amount outstanding of Domestic Debt Securities (DDS) and International Debt Securities (IDS) that are denominated in local currency. For some countries, for which only a subset of these statistics is available, we use the amount outstanding of DDS or Total Debt Securities (TDS) after subtracting IDS that are not denominated in local currency. If (TDS-IDS) is negative, we make it zero.
Source: Authors' calculation based on the BIS Debt Securities Statistics Note: The dependent variable is the difference of the exchange rate depreciation between period 2 (the taper tantrum) and period 1 (the global financial crisis). All the explanatory variables are similarly calculated be differencing the values between period 2 and period 1. India is included in the sample of emerging economies. Asia is a dummy variable for six Asian countries: China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denotes the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Sources: Authors' calculations. Note: The dependent variable is the difference of exchange rate depreciation between period 2 (the taper tantrum) and period 1 (the global financial crisis). All the explanatory variables are similarly calculated be differencing the values between period 2 and period 1. India is excluded from the sample of emerging economies. Asia is a dummy for six Asian countries: China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denotes the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Sources: Authors' calculations. Note: The dependent variable is the difference of exchange rate depreciation between period 2 (the taper tantrum) and period 1 (the global financial crisis). All the explanatory variables are similarly calculated be differencing the values between period 2 and period 1. Bank loans is measured by of domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) collected from World Development Indicators. Asia is a dummy variable for seven Asian countries: China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines Thailand and Vietnam. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denotes the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Sources: Authors' calculations. Note: The dependent variable is the difference of exchange rate depreciation between period 2 (the taper tantrum) and period 1 (the global financial crisis). All the explanatory variables are similarly calculated be differencing the values between period 2 and period 1. Stock market capitalization is measured as percentage of GDP, collected from World Development Indicators. Asia is a dummy variable for six Asian countries: China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denotes the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Sources: Authors' calculations. 
